Self-selection in the state school system

Donald Robertson and James Symons

Education Economics, 2003, vol. 11, issue 3, 259-272

Abstract: With diminishing returns to the peer group, it is optimal social policy to mix children in schools. We consider what happens when, contrary to the outcome being determined by a social planner, schools and children are free to seek each other out: with some caveats, this leads to perfect segregation by child quality. It is shown that this is the worst possible outcome. We show also that a competitive system produces the optimal allocation of children to schools.

Date: 2003
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Working Paper: Self-Selection in The State School System (1996)
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DOI: 10.1080/0964529032000148791

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