 Student Assessments, Non-test-takers, and School AccountabilityRobert Lemke (), Claus Hoerandner and Robert McMahon Education Economics, 2006, vol. 14, issue 2, 235-250 Abstract: Much attention has focused recently on using student test scores to evaluate public schools. The No Child Left Behind Act of 2002 requires states to test students and evaluate each school's progress toward having all students meet or exceed state standards. Under the law, however, schools only need to test 95% of their students. When some students do not take the test, variability arises in a school's evaluation as the score of each student who did not take the test remains unknown. Using a statewide assessment administered to 11th graders in Illinois, we investigate this source of variation. In our data, 8% of students do not take the test. By applying a bounding technique to the unknown scores of the non-test-takers, we show that classifying schools as failing or passing against some fixed threshold frequently can be misleading. We also provide evidence that some schools may be strategically selecting some students to not take the test and, by so doing, increasing the school's test scores. Keywords: No Child Left Behind; testing; accountability; gaming; education (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:edecon:v:14:y:2006:i:2:p:235-250 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1080/09645290600622970 Access Statistics for this article Education Economics is currently edited by Caren Wareing and Steve Bradley More articles in Education Economics from Taylor & Francis Journals |
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