A theory of tenure-track contracts

Bruce Cater, Byron Lew and Barry Smith

Education Economics, 2008, vol. 16, issue 2, 203-218

Abstract: This paper offers an explanation of the use of tenure-track contracts in academia. It argues that, because the results of academic research cannot be sold, a professor's profitability depends on the market value of the instruction he or she provides. But because that value depends directly on the extent of his or her observable research accomplishments, a profit-maximizing university will dismiss a professor who fails to initially establish a strong research record, but will tolerate a professor who fails to augment a record that is already strong.

Keywords: research; instruction; tenure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1080/09645290801939629

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