Rationality in Leviathan: Hobbes and his game-theoretic admirers

Mark Peacock

The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 2005, vol. 12, issue 2, 191-213

Abstract: Game theoretic analyses of Hobbes' Leviathan proliferate. By considering elements of Leviathan, which have been scrutinised inter alia by Gauthier, Hampton and Kavka, I argue that the approach capture Hobbes' notion of obligation insufficiently. I search for a concept of rationality in Hobbes' work that goes beyond that of game theory and find one in his distinction between science and prudence. If one attends to this distinction, one is forced to consider the significance of religion for Hobbes' conception of rationality. This, in turn, forces one to examine the status of Hobbes' 'self-preservation' postulate.

Keywords: Hobbes; Leviathan; rationality; state of nature; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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DOI: 10.1080/09672560500112678

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