 When low is no good: Predatory pricing and U.S. antitrust law (1950--1980)The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 2011, vol. 18, issue 5, 777-806 Abstract: The paper deals with the history of the antitrust offence of predatory pricing in U.S. antitrust law. Despite being considered so serious a violation to deserve a per se condemnation, predatory behaviour has never been easy to identify in real markets because pricing at a very low level is normally welfare-enhancing. For most of the twentieth century, the violation has been severely enforced by U.S. courts, though on the basis of a legal argument devoid of solid foundations in theoretical economics. The paper examines the critiques against this argument made by Chicago scholars, the literature stemming from these critiques, and the motivations behind the U-turn in enforcement triggered by the influential contribution by Areeda and Turner (1975). This story may tell a useful lesson about the different practices of economists, legal scholars, and judges with respect to the treatment of antitrust violations. Date: 2011 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:eujhet:v:18:y:2011:i:5:p:777-806 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1080/09672567.2011.616596 Access Statistics for this article The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought is currently edited by José Luís Cardoso More articles in The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought from Taylor & Francis Journals |
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