Economics of the crisis and the crisis of economics

Axel Leijonhufvud

The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 2014, vol. 21, issue 5, 760-774

Abstract: The macroeconomic instability revealed in the recent deep recession steams from the condition of balance sheets. Generally high leverage and strained maturity mismatches build up slowly but generate a financial structure so brittle that the impulse that eventually sends it crashing is hard to identify. The US financial system had been rendered more vulnerable by the financial reforms that swept away the Glass-Steagall regulations. The crisis made the inadquancies of the ruling macroeconomic paradigm painfully obvious. DSGE models generally did not include a financial sector and did not take the possibility of dramatic instability seriously. Unanticipated violations of budget constraints do not fit easily into general equilibrium models.

Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1080/09672567.2014.927519

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