Central bank independence, a not so new idea in the history of economic thought: a doctrine in the 1920s

Adriano Do Vale ()

The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 2021, vol. 28, issue 5, 811-843

Abstract: Central bank independence (CBI) has been a prominent topic for decades, but remains relatively unexplored in the history of economic thought. Relevant literature is scarce and focuses on the post-war period. To extend this literature, I argue that there was a doctrine of CBI in the 1920s. I examine its development from an international recommendation and a principle of the central banking doctrine designed by the British governor Norman to the elaborate doctrine of Kisch & Elkin. The paper’s main contribution is a detailed analysis of the doctrine of CBI provided in their reference book on central banking.

Date: 2021
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/09672567.2021.1908393 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:eujhet:v:28:y:2021:i:5:p:811-843

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/REJH20

DOI: 10.1080/09672567.2021.1908393

Access Statistics for this article

The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought is currently edited by Richard Sturn, Hans Michael Trautwein, Muriel Dal-Pont-Legrand and Maxime Desmarais-Tremblay

More articles in The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().