Central bank independence, a not so new idea in the history of economic thought: a doctrine in the 1920s

Adriano Do Vale ()

The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 2021, vol. 28, issue 5, 811-843

Abstract: Central bank independence (CBI) has been a prominent topic for decades, but remains relatively unexplored in the history of economic thought. Relevant literature is scarce and focuses on the post-war period. To extend this literature, I argue that there was a doctrine of CBI in the 1920s. I examine its development from an international recommendation and a principle of the central banking doctrine designed by the British governor Norman to the elaborate doctrine of Kisch & Elkin. The paper’s main contribution is a detailed analysis of the doctrine of CBI provided in their reference book on central banking.

Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1080/09672567.2021.1908393

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