Lexicographic preferences in Pascal’s Wager

Pavlo Blavatskyy

The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 2022, vol. 29, issue 1, 104-111

Abstract: Pascal’s wager is one of the most influential arguments in philosophy and decision theory. This paper reformulates Pascal’s wager in terms of two-outcome finite payoffs (one before death and one after death). The proposed reformulation accentuates the lexicographic nature of decision maker’s preferences. Lexicographic preferences violate the continuity axiom—a standard assumption of many theories of decision making under risk and uncertainty. Since Pascal’s wager assumes lexicographic (i.e., discontinuous) preferences, it is appropriate to represent the latter with lexicographic utility and not conventional expected utility theory.

Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1080/09672567.2021.1914700

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