 Walter Bagehot on central bank governance: lessons from Lombard Street (1873)Nesrine Bentemessek Kahia and Rebeca Gomez Betancourt The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 2024, vol. 31, issue 5, 708-729 Abstract: This article explores Walter Bagehot’s (1826–1877) proposals for improvement of the governance of the Bank of England after the Charter Act (1844). In his book Lombard Street (1873), Bagehot addresses the inherent dilemma faced by the Bank of England since its establishment in 1694. On one hand, it was a joint-stock bank with private shareholders, while on the other, it was entrusted with fundamental responsibilities for the public interest, including lending to the state, restructuring public debt, holding the nation’s gold reserve, and managing liquidity crises. According to Bagehot, if the Bank of England succeeded in solving this dilemma, it was mainly thanks to the implementation of governance principles that he introduced and discussed. The contribution of this article is to highlight Bagehot’s original proposals on central bank governance and their significance in reconciling the interests of the diverse stakeholders of the ‘Old Lady of Threadneedle’. Central bank governance in Bagehot is a topic that has not yet been discussed. Date: 2024 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:eujhet:v:31:y:2024:i:5:p:708-729 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1080/09672567.2024.2407326 Access Statistics for this article The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought is currently edited by José Luís Cardoso More articles in The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought from Taylor & Francis Journals |
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