Revisiting the role of value judgments in Arrow’s impossibility theorem

Nestor Lovera Nieto

The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 2024, vol. 31, issue 6, 976-997

Abstract: This paper analyses the role of value judgments in interpreting Arrow’s impossibility theorem. It begins by outlining the analytical method that leads to the impossibility result, then examines Arrow’s theorem through Mongin’s (1999, 2002, 2006b) perspective. Three reasons are presented showing how Mongin’s work illuminates Arrow’s stance on value judgments. This approach helps assess the significance of Arrow’s value judgments, both in evaluating each theorem condition and in considering the relaxation of certain conditions—particularly Unrestricted Domain (U) and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)—to address the impossibility result.

Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1080/09672567.2024.2433964

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