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The social construction of value: value theories and John Locke's framework of qualities

Wilfred Dolfsma ()

The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 1997, vol. 4, issue 3, 400-416

Abstract: Value theory is central to economics. Whenever new economic theories appear on stage, their theory of value is different. I classify value theories along Locke's lines of primary and secondary qualities. When value is thought to inhere in objects, value is a primary quality. The marginalists perceive value as given to objects by autonomous individuals independent of their environment (much like monads) with given preferences. Value here is a secondary quality. Both are unsatisfactory; value is a social construct. The question arises why social value theory, which Clark and Anderson worked on around the turn of the nineteenth century, did not take root.

Keywords: value theory; social value theory; valuation; John Locke; classification (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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DOI: 10.1080/10427719700000059

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