Planning's "Failure" to Ensure Efficient Market Delivery: A Lacanian Deconstruction of this Neoliberal Scapegoating Fantasy

Michael Gunder

European Planning Studies, 2016, vol. 24, issue 1, 21-38

Abstract: Our neoliberal governance model places a burden on planning to often take "responsibility" for the failure of market-lead governance to deliver its policy promises of betterment, security and future enjoyment. These include promised, but often-unachievable policies, such as those of increased global competitiveness for areas of structural economic decline; or housing affordability in areas of population growth and constrained land availability. Resultant policy failures then result in a scapegoating response where planning is held responsible. Examples include that economic development, or housing affordability, is obstructed by planning impediments, such as regulatory controls or process delays, which are claimed to hamper efficient market delivery. To deconstruct this neoliberal fantasy that planning often impedes policies for market-lead success, the article will first document exemplars of this scapegoating process. It will then explore the role of fantasy and ideology in governance policy formulation and, from a Lacanian perspective, the theorization that underlies this process. Then, it will investigate the role of the "scapegoat" for public policy facilitation so as to explain why planning is often placed in this role, and why this role is often ideologically necessary, at least for neoliberal governance, when planning undertaking its statutory responsibility of facilitating the public interest.

Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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DOI: 10.1080/09654313.2015.1067291

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