FRAND Royalties and Injunctions for Standard Essential Patents

Jay Choi

Global Economic Review, 2016, vol. 45, issue 3, 233-250

Abstract: I develop a stylized model of court procedures that resolve disputes concerning FRAND-encumbered standard essential patents (SEPs). I analyze the effects of injunctions and potential court-imposed FRAND rates on negotiated royalty rates. The SEP holders’ ability to hold-up is constrained by the prospect of the court-imposed license terms in case of disputes, but is not completely eliminated. Possible mechanisms to address the residual hold-up power of the SEP holders are discussed.

Date: 2016
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Working Paper: FRAND Royalties and Injunctions for Standard Essential Patents (2014)
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DOI: 10.1080/1226508X.2016.1211809

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