FRAND Royalties and Injunctions for Standard Essential Patents

Jay Choi

No 5012, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: I develop a stylized model of court procedures that resolve disputes concerning FRAND-encumbered standard essential patents (SEPs). I analyze the effects of injunctions and potential court-imposed FRAND rates on negotiated royalty rates. The SEP-holders’ ability to hold-up is constrained by the prospect of the court-imposed license terms in case of disputes, but is not completely eliminated. Possible mechanisms to address the residual hold-up power of the SEP-holders are discussed.

Keywords: standard essential patents; FRAND; injunctions. hold-up; patent litigation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K41 L24 O30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: FRAND Royalties and Injunctions for Standard Essential Patents (2016)
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