How to Measure the Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy: Frequency or Composition?

Pedro Barros, Joseph Clougherty and Jo Seldeslachts

International Journal of the Economics of Business, 2010, vol. 17, issue 1, 1-8

Abstract: We show that the number of merger proposals (frequency-based deterrence) is a more appropriate indicator of underlying changes in merger policy than the relative anti-competitiveness of merger proposals (composition-based deterrence). This has strong implications for the empirical analysis of the deterrence effects of merger policy enforcement, and potential implications regarding how to reduce anti-competitive merger proposals.

Keywords: Antitrust; Deterrence; Merger Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Working Paper: How to Measure the Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy: Frequency or Composition? (2009)
Working Paper: How to Measure the Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy: Frequency or Composition? (2009)
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DOI: 10.1080/13571510903516920

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