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Do dangerous sports specialists play more dangerously? An experimental study on sample selection

Luc Collard and Alexandre Oboeuf

Journal of Risk Research, 2013, vol. 16, issue 1, 39-50

Abstract: Dangerous/extreme sports specialists are often accused of reckless behaviour. The present research study sought to test that assumption. Sixty-six sportspeople (mean ± SD age: 20.3 ± 1.2) of both genders (including nine extreme sports specialists) took part in a sports game ('chickie run') which obliged them to choose between cautious and risky behaviours. The participants played each other in pairs, i.e. 65 matches per player. In 'chickie run', the two players start 20 m apart and run straight towards each other. If the players collide at the meeting point, they each lose 2 points. If both players 'chicken out' by deviating from their line, each scores 2 points. If one chickens out and the other does not, the defecting player scores 0 and the non-defector gains 4 points. In theory, players should defect every other time in the iterated 'chickie run' game (as long as one does not take account of the opponent's reputation). Out of the 2145 recorded matches, the sportspeople generally tended to play according to this symmetric risk (expected Nash equilibrium: 1 point per match). Only extreme sports specialists tended to maximize their score (1.34 points per match) by playing significantly more cautiously (they deviated 3 times out of 4, with a Maximin profile, p > 0.01).

Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1080/13669877.2012.725671

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