A research and defects analysis of the disaster relief system of China

Guo-Liang Luo

Journal of Risk Research, 2014, vol. 17, issue 3, 383-404

Abstract: Disasters, whether natural or human-induced, bring great pressure to governments. Disaster relief work can reflect the features of a government and test its ability in this respect. This article analyzes the basic political structure on which the establishment of China's disaster relief system is based and introduces some reform initiatives in disaster reduction that enhance the quick emergency response ability of governments. However, in view of the government feature of unitary responsiveness (U-form), it is doubtful whether such a government can pool resources to finish a 'central task' without ignoring many noncentral tasks. As a low-probability event, disaster relief is unlikely to become the central task of a government and thus tends to be ignored. Such neglect is strengthened by corruption, venality, and other unscrupulous behaviors resulting from the nexus between the government and businessmen and, radically, from the government's U-form character. This U-form feature strengthens China's 'strong government-weak society' structure, which becomes the leading cause of tense social contradictions and frequent violent conflicts. Therefore, the control of environmental hazards, epidemic transmission, food safety problems, mass disturbances, and other human-induced disasters depends fundamentally on the transition of the Chinese government from the unitary responsiveness to the multiple responsiveness.

Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1080/13669877.2013.815651

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