Using vNM expected utility theory to facilitate the decision-making in social ethics
Journal of Risk Research, 2015, vol. 18, issue 10, 1307-1319
The overall objective of this article is to demonstrate that in social ethics, certain problems related to decision-making are easier to resolve using conceptual tools borrowed from mathematics than using philosophical ethics theories, such as classical utilitarianism. With the help of a case study, the first part of the article will attempt to point out that if an agent bases his reasoning on the verbal and purely qualitative concepts of the classical utilitarian theory, he will find himself confronting 'undecidable' dilemmas, for which making a specific choice becomes almost arbitrary. The second part of the article proposes a more formal quantification of utility and attitude towards risk that can help the agent to overcome the uncertainties emanating from a strictly qualitative perception of the real world's configuration. This method for decision-making is inspired by the works of Howard Raiffa, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:jriskr:v:18:y:2015:i:10:p:1307-1319
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Risk Research is currently edited by Bryan MacGregor
More articles in Journal of Risk Research from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().