Capture Theory and the Public Interest: Balancing Competing Values to Ensure Regulatory Effectiveness

Michael R. Potter, Amanda M. Olejarski and Stefanie M. Pfister

International Journal of Public Administration, 2014, vol. 37, issue 10, 638-645

Abstract: Problems arise when a regulatory agency acts in the interests of the industry it is charged with regulating, rather than in the public interest. When a governmental agency established to regulate an industry for the benefit of society acts instead for the interests of the industry it is regulating, it has been “captured” by the industry. This article examines the level of input received from the regulated community and the tendency of regulatory agency capture. Here, the proposed zone of effectiveness suggests a balance between the two scopes by incorporating a stronger focus on public interest.

Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1080/01900692.2014.903266

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