Tax Evasion and the Role of the State Actor(s) in Bangladesh

Mohammad Nurunnabi

International Journal of Public Administration, 2019, vol. 42, issue 10, 823-839

Abstract: Little attention has been paid to tax evasion in developing countries due to a lack of data. This article addresses this lacuna by investigating the tax evasion practices and finds significant increases in tax evasion in Bangladesh. The study makes a major contribution to the literature in tax evasion, and indicates that the norms of state actor(s) (i.e. the National Board of Revenue–the sole tax authority in Bangladesh) lie in the interests of politicians and the continuation of corruption. The legitimacy of the state actors in this case means that they act as facilitators for increasing tax evasion practices. Therefore, the current system has endured remarkably robustly to date, and coercive isomorphism is indeed needed in the institutionalization process.

Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1080/01900692.2018.1520245

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