Deepwater or Troubled Water? Principal–Agent Theory and Performance-Based Contracting in the Coast Guard’s Deepwater Modernization Program

Mark D. Gordon, John C. Morris and Joshua Steinfeld

International Journal of Public Administration, 2019, vol. 42, issue 4, 298-309

Abstract: In the mid-1990s, the United States Coast Guard began planning a modernization effort known as the Deepwater program to replace an aging inventory of cutters, aircraft, and small boats. This effort involved a consortium of corporations to develop a “system of systems” to meet performance-based requirements and build the new equipment. This article examines the Deepwater program through the lens of multilayered principal–agent theory and evaluates the performance-based contracting (PBC) method used to alleviate strains linked to accountability from the principal–agent relationship. The findings help better understand the dilemmas prescribed from multilayered principal–agent theory and PBC by illustrating the accountability issues faced by smaller organizations when engaging in complex, large-scale procurement.

Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1080/01900692.2018.1439061

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