Refining the Concepts of Territorial Revenue Assignment, Substate Fiscal Self-rule and Territorial Fiscal Balance

Franz Xavier Barrios-Suvelza

International Journal of Public Administration, 2019, vol. 42, issue 5, 432-454

Abstract: Fiscal federalism has offered a template for understanding intergovernmental fiscal relations. Yet when politicians are involved in day-to-day decentralization it may happen that some of the normative elements of fiscal federalism do not fit reality. Substate entities may go beyond the own-source paradigm and have a practical interest in alternative forms of fiscal self-rule. To better understand this pragmatism a threefold stage model of territorial revenue assignment is presented drawing on some insights offered by Germany’s fiscal constitution. Within this framework a reassessment of the role of territorial levels as levels during vertical revenue assignment is undertaken, a new typology of fiscal self-rule is introduced, and finally a theory of multiple territorial fiscal balance points is outlined, including the one based on the real domain of substate own policy-making.

Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1080/01900692.2018.1466899

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