Who Is Inclined to Hide the Truth: Evidence from Public Procurement

Andrei Yakovlev, Andrey Tkachenko and Yuliya Rodionova

International Journal of Public Administration, 2020, vol. 43, issue 13, 1109-1120

Abstract: This paper presents a survey-based methodological approach to detect potential opportunism by counterparts who are linked with agents through contractual relations. The methodology proposes asking counterparts about attitudes toward some behaviors of agents, which are undesirable from the principal and benevolent counterpart perspective. The approach identifies the potential opportunism of counterparts based on the intensity with which they justify such behavior and provide unrealistic assessments of commonly known problems. The approach is especially important in a situation where the rules are inconsistent with reality and the principal can no longer disentangle the benevolent and opportunistic behavior of the agent. The authors test this approach by conducting a survey of procurers and suppliers of public procurement contracts in Russia.

Date: 2020
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/01900692.2019.1665683 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:lpadxx:v:43:y:2020:i:13:p:1109-1120

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/lpad20

DOI: 10.1080/01900692.2019.1665683

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Public Administration is currently edited by Ali Farazmand

More articles in International Journal of Public Administration from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().