The Weakness of Strong (and Weak) Ties: Obtaining a Government Job

Fanyi Kong and Xuhong Su

International Journal of Public Administration, 2020, vol. 43, issue 9, 790-803

Abstract: Between merit principles and social contacts, how they facilitate individuals to obtain a government job in the United States remains unsettled. Based on a survey administered via Amazon Mturk, this study finds that merit-based selection constitutes the most significant means to obtain public jobs, particularly so in state and local governments despite of sizeable respondents claiming other venues. The use of social contacts, including both strong and weak ties, shows little advantage on obtaining public employment but proves significant in private organizations. Controlling individuals’ previous job obtaining experience, the study contends that variations on job obtaining methods can be reasonably attributable to institutional distinctiveness that features different rules, procedures and regulations. Merit principles are kept alive in governments, though challenges persist, particularly so in federal government. The study ends up with a discussion of research findings and their implications in HR practices.

Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1080/01900692.2019.1659816

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