Stay-at-Home Request or Order? A Study of the Regulation of Individual Behavior during a Pandemic Crisis in Japan

Naomi Aoki

International Journal of Public Administration, 2021, vol. 44, issue 11-12, 885-895

Abstract: This study examines whether a stay-at-home order with penalties would be an effective measure for regulating public behavior during a pandemic lockdown, through an online experiment conducted in Japan. Amidst the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020, authorities around the world have taken measures to limit civil liberties by means of stay-at-home orders, with penalties for infractions. In contrast, Japan has avoided legal sanctions and sought voluntary cooperation from the public. This self-restraint request might work to deter public activity in Japan, whose society is known for conformity and social order. Nevertheless, the study found that penalties do make a difference in the intention to stay home, especially in places with high infection rates, such as Tokyo. This piece of evidence could contribute to a broader discourse on what sort of measures to take to encourage public cooperation or compliance and how to balance civil liberties and national health.

Date: 2021
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/01900692.2021.1912087 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:lpadxx:v:44:y:2021:i:11-12:p:885-895

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/lpad20

DOI: 10.1080/01900692.2021.1912087

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Public Administration is currently edited by Ali Farazmand

More articles in International Journal of Public Administration from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().