Socioeconomic Status, Norms and Bribe-Giving Behaviors Among Citizens of Vietnam
Phuong Anh Nguyen and
Quang Canh Le
International Journal of Public Administration, 2022, vol. 45, issue 1, 37-48
Abstract:
Bribe-giving of individuals is not only affected by their calculation and knowledge but also the social pressure to comply with the informal norms of corruption. This article investigates the impacts of socioeconomic status and social norms on the individuals’ probability of bribe-giving to access public services. It uses the Probit regression models with robust standard errors to analyze the relationship using data adapted from the Vietnam Global Corruption Barometer and Vietnam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index surveys. The study employs the bargaining power framework and finds that highly educated people, the poor, and the unemployed were less likely to give bribes. Additionally, citizens living in strong anti-corruption communities and rural areas are less likely to give bribes. These empirical results shed light on the policy design and implementation of anti-corruption measures in emerging countries like Vietnam.
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:lpadxx:v:45:y:2022:i:1:p:37-48
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DOI: 10.1080/01900692.2021.1925909
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