Conviction and Punishment

Xiaowen Tian and Vai Io Lo

Public Management Review, 2009, vol. 11, issue 2, 155-172

Abstract: Democratic institutions are not equally effective in curbing corruption. Using a criminal behavior model, this study formulates the hypothesis that corruption offenders, being risk-inclined, are deterred more by conviction-reinforcing democratic institutions than by punishment-reinforcing democratic institutions. Evidence based on cross-country regressions strongly supports this hypothesis, indicating that compared with competitive election, free press is a more effective deterrent to corruption. While shedding light on why corruption remains rampant in some electoral democracies -- particularly the illiberal democracies -- this study identifies a key to corruption control.

Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1080/14719030802685479

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