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A Critical Appraisal of the Current Use of Transaction Cost Explanations for Government Make-Or-Buy Choices: Towards a Contingent Theory and Forms of Tests

Tobias Johansson

Public Management Review, 2015, vol. 17, issue 5, 661-678

Abstract: This article aims at contributing to the extant literature on government make-or-buy choices building on transaction cost economics (TCE) by explicitly theorizing about transaction alignment and its relation to performance. It is argued that current theoretical and empirical models of government make-or-buy choices are not able to make predictions that corroborate theory. They are dependent upon the assumption of perfect competition that is ill-suited for the public sector setting. Instead, contingent models that take performance differences into account constitute a more valid model of TCE in this setting. In this article, theoretical models and empirical approaches for such a research agenda are developed.

Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1080/14719037.2013.848922

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