Does Pursuing External Incentives Compromise Public Service Motivation? Comparing the effects of job security and high pay
Chung-An Chen and
Chih-Wei Hsieh
Public Management Review, 2015, vol. 17, issue 8, 1190-1213
Abstract:
The pursuit of both job security and high pay as main reasons for job selection, according to self-determination theory (SDT), implies that people are controlled by external conditions (i.e. external regulation) and thus unlikely to be driven by altruistic values. Conceptually, however, pursuing high pay and pursuing job security seemingly carry disparate connotations. While the former signifies the love of money, which is thought to be incompatible with public service motivation (PSM), the latter accompanies motivation crowding-in, which may correlate positively with PSM. We tested this proposition by using the data collected from 514 municipal middle managers in Taiwan, and it received strong support. Results further show that pay satisfaction moderates the negative relationship between pursuing high pay and PSM. In the conclusion, we discuss how these findings shed light on contemporary administrative reform.
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:pubmgr:v:17:y:2015:i:8:p:1190-1213
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DOI: 10.1080/14719037.2014.895032
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