Managerial Objectives and the Governance of Public and Non-Profit Organizations

Stijn Van Puyvelde, Ralf Caers, Cind Du Bois and Marc Jegers

Public Management Review, 2016, vol. 18, issue 2, 221-237

Abstract: By investigating managerial objectives, we test the simultaneous need for both control (agency theory) and collaboration (stewardship theory) in public and non-profit governance. We construct a discrete choice experiment to elicit preferences of managers in Belgian public and non-profit nursing homes. The results confirm that boards of nursing homes may experience pressure to simultaneously control and collaborate with their managers, thereby suggesting that agency and stewardship theory can be combined into a more general internal governance framework. We conclude by providing some policy implications to improve public and non-profit governance.

Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1080/14719037.2014.969760

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