Competition and Efficiency after Privatization: The Role of the NAO

Ron Hodges

Public Money & Management, 1997, vol. 17, issue 1, 35-42

Abstract: One of the arguments for privatization is to promote market competition in order to facilitate efficiency gains. This review of NAO privatization reports shows that the promotion of competition is rarely stated as an objective of a privatization and, where it is, it can lead to difficulties in drawing objective audit conclusions. The work of the regulators is of considerable importance after privatization; and a more recent role for the NAO is that of responsibility for the financial audit and value-for-money studies of these regulators. These NAO studies provide new opportunities to review the effectiveness of the regulators and to promote accountability in competition policy after privatization.

Date: 1997
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/1467-9302.00054 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:pubmmg:v:17:y:1997:i:1:p:35-42

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RPMM20

DOI: 10.1111/1467-9302.00054

Access Statistics for this article

Public Money & Management is currently edited by Michaela Lavender

More articles in Public Money & Management from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().