Has Devolution Increased Democratic Accountability?

Mahmoud Ezzamel, Noel S. Hyndman, Åge Johnsen, Irvine Lapsley and June Pallot

Public Money & Management, 2004, vol. 24, issue 3, 145-152

Abstract: This article examines the impact of devolution, the New Public Management and public management culture on accounting for democratic accountability in the first term of the devolved national assemblies and parliament in the UK. Although there is more openness, transparency, consultation and scrutiny with regard to budgets, accounts and performance as a result of devolution, there is extensive information overload. Thus, many politicians are highly dependent on the parliamentary division of labour and are reliant on experts and advisors functioning as buffers and filters of accounting information.

Date: 2004
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1467-9302.2004.00411.x (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:pubmmg:v:24:y:2004:i:3:p:145-152

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RPMM20

DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9302.2004.00411.x

Access Statistics for this article

Public Money & Management is currently edited by Michaela Lavender

More articles in Public Money & Management from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().