Holding politicians to account? Overview and scrutiny in English local government

Andrew Coulson and Philip Whiteman

Public Money & Management, 2012, vol. 32, issue 3, 185-192

Abstract: Recently, there has been little research published on overview and scrutiny. This article revisits the early literature. By restating and developing six conditions for the effectiveness of overview and scrutiny set out in UK government guidance in 2002, it demonstrates why success has been patchy but that scrutiny can work well when the conditions are met. The system exemplifies the doctrine of the separation of powers, in that the politicians who sit on overview and scrutiny committees are charged with holding to account another group of elected politicians who form the executive or cabinet. The practice of scrutiny could be strengthened if it was embedded as part of a wider process in which the full council holds the executive to account.

Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1080/09540962.2012.676275

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