Public corporate governance of state-owned enterprises: evidence from the Spanish banking industry

Tamyko Ysa, Mireia Giné, Marc Esteve and Vicenta Sierra

Public Money & Management, 2012, vol. 32, issue 4, 265-272

Abstract: This article provides a framework for public corporate governance combining two main components: traditional corporate governance (via governing bodies) and multi-level governance (via regulation). We provide evidence from the publiclyowned Spanish savings banks (‘cajas’), which have a conflict between their two main goals: operating efficiently and maximizing the reach of their welfare projects. The case may have lessons for policy-makers in the 80+ countries that have some government ownership of banks, and for managers muddling through public corporate governance.

Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:pubmmg:v:32:y:2012:i:4:p:265-272

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DOI: 10.1080/09540962.2012.691305

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