Playing for keeps: local government distortion of depreciation accruals in response to high-stakes public policy-making

Joseph Drew

Public Money & Management, 2018, vol. 38, issue 1, 57-64

Abstract: Use of discretionary accounting accruals has long been recognized as a vehicle for earnings management in the private sector. More recently, evidence has emerged suggesting that public officials may similarly manipulate discretionary accruals in order to achieve ‘balanced’ operating results. This paper extends the previous literature on the manipulation of depreciation accruals to the realm of high-stakes public policy-making.

Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1080/09540962.2017.1389542

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