Risk disclosure practices: Does institutional imperative matter?

Mohammad Istiaq Azim and Shamsun Nahar

Public Money & Management, 2022, vol. 42, issue 6, 388-394

Abstract: This article will help government managers, regulators, and standard setters to improve risk management and disclosure in emerging economies. Evidence from in-depth interviews will guide government-owned banks in Bangladesh to effectively manage and voluntarily disclose risk management practices. The authors argue that legitimization might be a strategy for government-owned banks in pursuing to survive in the finance industry.ABSTRACTGovernment-owned banks in emerging economies commonly suffer from a lack of good governance, non-performing loans, undetected money laundering and other management malpractices. Managing and disclosing risks are significant issues for managers of government-owned banks. This article explores the managerial perception of risk disclosure by these government banks. Data were collected through in-depth interviews with 35 executives from government banks, government regulatory, and monitoring authorities. Institutional pressure, along with risk committees and board independence, are critical contributing factors for risk disclosure.

Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1080/09540962.2021.1994736

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