Informal practices and efficiency in public procurement

Yuliya Rodionova, Juraj Nemec, Andrey Tkachenko and Andrei Yakovlev

Public Money & Management, 2024, vol. 44, issue 3, 225-233

Abstract: In environments with incentives for opportunism, effective tools to limit corruption in public procurement are necessary. The authors show that monitoring and law enforcement tools are more important than the strict regulation. A simple transfer of regulation from developed countries to transitional economies does not deliver the desired procurement performance without proper enforcement. Regulators need to consider the scale of opportunism among procurement participants—if it is high, it is necessary to focus on monitoring and law enforcement capabilities.

Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1080/09540962.2022.2159169

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