The grand bargain on local government debt: Evidence from China's intergovernmental relations

Xuefeng Shao and Xinda Li

Public Money & Management, 2025, vol. 45, issue 4, 338-348

Abstract: This article provides a deeper understanding of policy implementation in local government, highlighting the key role of subnational governments in public risk governance. In fiscally centralized countries with significant local government debt problems, officials at the central government level cannot effectively mitigate local government debt risks solely through restrictive financing policies. The authors explain why policy-makers at the central government level in these countries need to revaluate the structure of the local government financial system.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1080/09540962.2024.2334066

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