Clientelism and identity
Daniel Houser (),
Stuti Khemani (),
Ginny Seung Choi and
Economic and Political Studies, 2021, vol. 9, issue 1, 113-133
Electoral clientelism or vote buying has been regarded as undermining democratic institutions and weakening the accountability of the state towards its citizens, especially the poor. Social identity as a form of political mobilisation may contribute to this, enabling support to be won with clientelist transfers. This paper reports data from a novel laboratory experiment designed to examine whether clientelism can be sustained as a political strategy, and whether identity impacts the nature or efficacy of clientelism. Specifically, we design a voting and leadership game in order to examine whether individuals vote for clientelist allocations by a leader even at the expense of more efficient and egalitarian allocations. We find group identity does not significantly impact the prevalence of clientelist plans. Leaders are more likely, however, to choose allocations that provide fewer benefits (lower rents) to themselves when they are part of the majority in-group than when they are in the minority.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:repsxx:v:9:y:2021:i:1:p:113-133
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
Economic and Political Studies is currently edited by Qing He and Cunna Li
More articles in Economic and Political Studies from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().