EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Bubbles and incentives: an experiment on asset markets

Stéphane Robin, Kateřina Strážnická and Marie Claire Villeval

Economic and Political Studies, 2021, vol. 9, issue 1, 68-89

Abstract: We explore the effects of competitive incentives and of their time horizon on the evolution of both asset prices and trading activity in experimental asset markets. We compare (i) a no-bonus treatment; (ii) a short-term bonus treatment in which bonuses are assigned to the best performers at the end of each trading period; (iii) a long-term bonus treatment in which bonuses are assigned to the best performers at the end of the 15 periods of the market. We find that the existence of bonus contracts does not increase the likelihood of bubbles but it affects their severity, depending on the time horizon of bonuses. Markets with long-term bonus contracts experience lower price deviations and a lower turnover of assets than markets with either no bonuses or long-term bonus contracts. Short-term bonus contracts increase price deviations but only when markets include a higher share of male traders. At the individual level, the introduction of bonus contracts increases the trading activity of males, probably due to their higher competitiveness.

Date: 2021
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/20954816.2020.1839158 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Bubbles and incentives: an experiment on asset markets (2021) Downloads
Working Paper: Bubbles and Incentives: An Experiment on Asset Markets (2012) Downloads
Working Paper: Bubbles and Incentives: An Experiment on Asset Markets (2012) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:repsxx:v:9:y:2021:i:1:p:68-89

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/reps20

DOI: 10.1080/20954816.2020.1839158

Access Statistics for this article

Economic and Political Studies is currently edited by Qing He and Cunna Li

More articles in Economic and Political Studies from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-20
Handle: RePEc:taf:repsxx:v:9:y:2021:i:1:p:68-89