What Monetary Policy after the Crisis?

Philip Arestis and Malcolm Sawyer ()

Review of Political Economy, 2010, vol. 22, issue 4, 499-515

Abstract: The objective of this paper is to reflect on some of the implications that recent economic experience has for monetary and financial stability policies. We contend that the financial crisis and the upsurge in inflation 2007-08 have shown that the policy model based on the new consensus in macroeconomics, which largely held sway over the past decade or more, is broken. It is argued that inflation targeting cannot deliver low inflation. We argue that fine-tuning through interest rates should not be attempted, but rather a constant real interest rate target based on the output growth rate should be adopted. The key objective of monetary policy should be shifted to financial stability, the independence of central banks should be brought to an end, and their decision making should be coordinated with other macroeconomic policy initiatives.

Date: 2010
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DOI: 10.1080/09538259.2010.510313

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