Economic Coordination across Divergent Institutional Frameworks: Dissolving a Theoretical Antinomy

Marta Podemska-Mikluch and Richard E. Wagner

Review of Political Economy, 2017, vol. 29, issue 2, 249-266

Abstract: Economic theory contains a significant theoretical antinomy. Markets are thought to secure coordination in self-organized fashion. In contrast, polities are portrayed as securing coordination through planning and administration. Doing this is to commit what Michael Resnick calls the ‘centralized mindset’, which is to attribute an observed order to some ordering agent. This article seeks to dissolve this theoretical antinomy by explaining how the same coordinative principles are at work throughout a society. All societies operate in generally coordinated fashion, due to the operation of transactional processes within societies. Markets and polities both operate through transactional relationships, though political transactions are constructed somewhat differently than market transactions. This article sets forth an approach to explaining coordination throughout a societal ecology where that coordination is achieved through different forms of transaction.

Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1080/09538259.2016.1269425

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