Political Economy of Industrial Development in Vietnam’s Telecommunications Industry: A Rent Management Analysis

Christine Ngoc Ngo

Review of Political Economy, 2017, vol. 29, issue 3, 454-477

Abstract: This article contributes to the current debate in economics on the uses and benefits of rents and rent seeking. On the one hand, public choice and neoliberal scholars highlight the redistributive and damaging aspects of rent seeking, thus rendering the policy suggestion to completely eradicate rents and rent seeking in an economy. On the other hand, institutional and development economists point out the inherent theoretical inconsistencies shown in the earlier models, and suggest that certain types of rent and rent seeking could be growth-enhancing. Using the Developmental Rent Management Analysis, this article assesses the industrial development of the telecommunications industry in Vietnam using two case studies. Qualitative research points out a number of rent management factors contributing both to the industry’s failure before the early 2000s and its subsequent success thereafter. The successful development of the telecommunications industry was fundamentally based on (i) favorable political support for rent creation, (ii) an effective structure of rent allocation and implementation, and (iii) credible incentives and pressures that encouraged local firms’ industrial upgrading. The Vietnamese experience suggests that rents can be developmental, conceivably side-by-side with rent seeking, cronyism and corruption.

Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1080/09538259.2017.1339436

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