 A Dynamic Theory of Public Banks (and Why it Matters)Review of Political Economy, 2022, vol. 34, issue 2, 356-371 Abstract: Public banks are pervasive, with more than 900 worldwide, and powerful, having assets nearing $49 trillion. Yet they are too often perceived as static financial institutions, based on economic theories that begin from fixed notions of what it is to be a publicly owned bank. This has given rise to polarized debate wherein public banks are characterized as being either essentially good or bad. This is unrealistic and unhelpful as we seek ways to confront the crises of finance and of climate finance. We need instead to rethink public banks as dynamic and contested institutions within the public spheres of states. In this view, public ownership itself predetermines nothing but it does open up a particular public realm of possibilities. Change becomes possible and is a result of social forces making it so, if within the structural confines of gendered, racialized, and class-divided capitalist society. A dynamic theory of public banks provides a novel theoretical alternative and a practical pathway towards financing green and just transitions in the public interest. Date: 2022 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:revpoe:v:34:y:2022:i:2:p:356-371 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1080/09538259.2021.1898110 Access Statistics for this article Review of Political Economy is currently edited by Steve Pressman and Louis-Philippe Rochon More articles in Review of Political Economy from Taylor & Francis Journals |
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