Unemployment and Workers' Control

Chris Doucouliagos

Review of Political Economy, 1997, vol. 9, issue 2, 151-179

Abstract: The relationship between democratic workers' control and unemployment is explored. When unemployment arises from labor market distortions, market imperfections, or from information imperfections, labor-managed firms are superior to capitalist firms. The firm's governance and decision making structures then play an instrumental role in the level of unemployment. However, when involuntary unemployment arises from effective demand failures, then workers' control may not be able to maintain or to restore full employment. In such cases, collective and coordinated efforts are needed to reduce the level of involuntary unemployment.

Date: 1997
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DOI: 10.1080/09538259700000032

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