How quality reporting reduces accountability deficit and overload

Yousueng Han and Shui Yan Tang

Public Management Review, 2022, vol. 24, issue 12, 2079-2100

Abstract: A critical issue in public accountability is how to reduce chances for dysfunctionalities. This research addresses it by examining both theoretically and empirically how quality reporting may reduce accountability deficit and overload in a multi-principal setting. Analyses of data from the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) during the Bush Administration show that programs exhibiting higher reporting quality attained higher performance ratings, which, in turn, led to larger budgetary recommendations. Higher reporting quality also helped reduce the differences between presidential and congressional budgetary decisions. This article contributes to developing a contingent, process-based theory of public accountability.

Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1080/14719037.2021.1963823

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