Short- and long-term delegation: what are the effects on politicians’ sense of control?

Marte Winsvold, Hilde Hatleskog Zeiner and Sigrid Stokstad

Public Management Review, 2023, vol. 25, issue 3, 620-636

Abstract: The ability of elected representatives to ensure that output is in line with political priorities is a core element of representative democracy. The article explores how delegation affects politicians’ sense of control over the administration, examining delegation practices in Norwegian municipalities and the effects of accountability mechanisms. We find no effects of long-term delegation but negative effects of short-term delegation, indicating that politicians have shorter time horizons than assumed by the NPM notion of strategic political leadership. The negative effects are exacerbated when councillors interact with citizens, suggesting that short-term delegation offers insufficient leeway for politicians when addressing citizen input.

Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1080/14719037.2021.1988271

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