Performance management, gaming and regulatory monitoring: a theoretical model and applications

Shlomo Mizrahi and Yizhaq Minchuk

Public Management Review, 2023, vol. 25, issue 6, 1152-1168

Abstract: This paper addresses the problems of gaming behaviour as expressed in untruthful reporting, manipulation of data and performance measures, and distortion of information. We apply game-theoretical principal-agent reasoning that refers to the marginal costs and benefits of gaming and oversight, pointing to policy measures for ensuring more effort exerted in productive activity rather than in gaming activity. These measures are the regulatory monitoring of agents’ activities rather than the control and supervision of them. We base our suggestions on behavioural economics and nudge research. Regulatory monitoring mechanisms are transparent and ‘soft’, so they moderate the adversarial nature of principal-agent relations.

Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1080/14719037.2021.2007668

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