A randomised scheme for secured modular exponentiation against power analysis attacks

Moushumi Barman and Hridoy Jyoti Mahanta

Cyber-Physical Systems, 2019, vol. 5, issue 4, 209-230

Abstract: This paper presents an approach to compute secured modular exponentiation to mitigate power analysis attacks. Two processes have been designed based on ‘multiply-always’ binary method, which injects dummy multiplications so that the original multiplications can remain intact. The two processes are being invoked based on a random variable, which generated either 0 or 1. With these randomised modular exponentiation, the proposed approach can resist simple and differential power analysis attacks to a large extent. The proposed approach has been implemented using conventional ‘squaring-multiplication’ and ‘Montgomery-Ladder’ methods. Further, the work has also been extended to CRT-RSA, which is widely used for fast computation. The proposed method has been implemented for different key sizes of 1024-bit, 1536-bit and 2048-bit RSA & CRT-RSA. The analysis and results show that with a complexity of $$O(n)$$O(n), the proposed approach can resist some of the standard DPA attacks on modular exponentiation.

Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1080/23335777.2019.1637944

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