Combined trust model based on evidence theory in iterated prisoner's dilemma game

Bo Chen, Bin Zhang and Weidong Zhu

International Journal of Systems Science, 2011, vol. 42, issue 1, 63-80

Abstract: In the iterated prisoner's dilemma game, agents often play defection based on mutual distrust for the sake of their own benefits. However, most game strategies and mechanisms are limited for strengthening cooperative behaviour in the current literature, especially in noisy environments. In this article, we construct a combined trust model by combining the locally owned information and the recommending information from other agents and develop a combined trust strategy in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game. The proposed game strategy can provide not only a higher payoff for agents, but also a trust mechanism for the system. Furthermore, agents can form their own reputation evaluations upon their opponents and make more rational and precise decisions under our framework. Simulations of application are performed to show the performance of the proposed strategy in noise-free and noisy environments.

Date: 2011
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DOI: 10.1080/00207720903434771

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